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ANTITRUST: STANDING FOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS-
Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
The Supreme Court has recently ruled that a foreign government is
entitled to bring an action for treble damages under the federal an-
titrust laws.' The case stems from alleged antitrust violations in the
marketing of tetracycline by six domestic corporations.' The decision is
significant as to its immediate impact upon American corporations do-
ing business abroad, and demonstrates the lengths to which the
Supreme Court will expand and support the notion of private antitrust
enforcement.
The case turned on a question of statutory interpretation. Section 4
of the Clayton Act provides that "[a]ny person who shall be injured in
his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the an-
titrust laws" is entitled to bring a suit for treble damages.3 A "person"
under the antitrust laws is "deemed to include corporations and
associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the
United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State,
or the laws of any foreign country."'4 The issue raised was whether a
foreign nation is a "person" under these provisions.
The majority looked to two earlier decisions for guidance: United
States v. Cooper Corp.5 and Georgia v. Evans.6 In Cooper, the Court
decided that the United States was not a "person" for the purposes of
the treble damages provisions of § 7 of the Sherman Act, and
therefore, was not entitled to bring suit for such a claim. That section
of the Sherman Act was later re-enacted, without substantial change,
as § 4 of the Clayton Act. The theory underlying the case was that
whereas the Sherman Act provided several independent remedies for
the United States when confronted with antitrust violations, the same
could not be said of a private suit. the government could have either
brought criminal prosecutions, sought injunctive relief, or seized pro-
perty. The Court distinguished these remedies which were exclusively
I Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
2 For a brief history of the case, see Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d. 532, 533-35
(8th Cir. 1972).
3 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
4 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1976).
1 312 U.S. 600 (1940).
6 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
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available to the United States, from the ones created in § 7 of the
Sherman Act. The right to recover treble damages was of a different
character than the government remedies and, according to the Court,
was created solely to redress private injury. The conclusion reached
was that the United States was not entitled to bring a treble damages
action under the antitrust laws.
If the United States were foreclosed from bringing suit under § 7,
was that rule controlling where a domestic state purported to bring the
action? This was the question presented in Evans. The Court noted
that whereas the United States had several remedies available to it, a
state would have none if it were prevented from bringing an antitrust
action. Such a result would have been anomalous, since domestic
states, when they function as commercial entities, are subject to the
same anticompetitive practices as private individuals. Accordingly, the
Court ruled that a state was a "person" within the purview of § 7 of
the Sherman Act. Though no legislative history existed to support this
reading, the Court saw no reason to deprive a domestic state of the
remedy afforded other victims of antitrust violations.
On the basis of these decisions, the Pfizer majority concluded that
a foreign state is entitled to sue for treble damages under § 4 of the
Clayton Act. The Court perceived that foreign nations are as suscepti-
ble to anticompetitive practices as are domestic states.' Equally impor-
tant, a right of action can operate as an effective deterrent to antitrust
violations, while treble damage recoveries help deprive violators of "the
fruits of their illegality." There is no reason to believe that these pur-
poses would not be served by affording standing to a foreign govern-
ment. Still further, the Court rebutted the contention that its decision
would be inconsistent with the primary concern of Congress to protect
American consumers. It was pointed out that the conspiracy alleged by
the plaintiffs operated in both domestic and international markets. In
a case such as this, maximum deterrence is obtained by affording tre-
ble damage remedies wherever the violations occur. 9 This last argu-
ment is rather convincing, in light of the antitrust standing granted to
foreign corporations.
The dissenters, led by Chief Justice Burger, with a supporting dis-
sent by Justice Powell, argued that the interpretation was directly at
odds with the plain meaning of the statute,1 0 lacked supporting
' Pfizer, Inc. v. Got't of India, 434 U.S. at 318.
a Id. at 314.
9 Id. at 315.
'0 Id. at 321 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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legislative history," was not dictated by the result in Evans'2 and con-
stituted "an undisguised exercise of legislative power."'13 Certainly, the
criticism is justified on the first two grounds. There is nothing in the
statutory provisions which would indicate an intent on the part of Con-
gress to confer standing on foreign nations. The decision by Congress
to list all parties deemed to be "persons" under the Act would allow
for the inference that all not included are excluded. The majority, in
fact, conceded that the question was never raised at the time of
passage of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 14 The majority's position,
rather than resting on solid statutory analysis, is founded on some very
general observations of policy expressing the view that the antitrust
laws contemplate a broad scope of remedies.'"
The same interpretative arguments, however, would have been ap-
propriate in Evans. The dissenters recognized this: ". .. while the
result in Evans is a tolerable taking of certain liberties with the literal
language of the statute, the congruence of that result with Congress'
purpose can scarcely be doubted.' 6 Their certainty rests on Justice
Frankfurter's notion in Evans that the state acts on behalf of its
citizens; to deny the state a remedy would in effect deprive those very
citizens for whom the antitrust laws were enacted. 7 If the dissenters
are willing to accept the divinations of Justice Frankfurter as to con-
gressional purpose, their reluctance to adopt those of the majority
seems somewhat inconsistent.
The dissenters would treat the antitrust standing of domestic and
foreign states as entirely different matters. According to their view, the
foreign sovereign's freedom to enact and enforce its own antitrust
legislation, and its greater economic and social power, justifies a dif-
ferent approach from that accorded a domestic state. As to the latter
distinction, the spectrum of power among the nations of the world is
so wide-ranging that the argument seems more perfunctory than
meaningful. The former contention is more interesting. Certainly,
there is substantial antitrust monitoring among the industrialized
powers.' 8 The likelihood, however, of an underdeveloped power taking
11 Id. at 324-25.
it Id. at 325.
18 Id. at 320.
14 Id. at 312.
18 Id. at 312-13.
I d. at 326.
" Id. at 594.
IS For a recent discussion on the increasingly intense antitrust climate developing
among the industrialized nations see Brault, Current Developments in Competition
Policies, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 157 (1977).
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an aggressive antitrust stand is somewhat remote. If we consider the
bargaining power possessed by these nations in relation to the giant
multinational corporations, comprehensive antitrust enforcement (if
the expertise could be mustered) would mean a departure by the firm
for greener pastures. The absence of an antitrust remedy is more likely
than not a real problem for many of the sovereign nations of the
world. 19
Finally, the dissenting opinion touched on the "political delicacy"
of the question. This is, no doubt, a decision which has potential
foreign policy impact. The majority had referred to a letter from the
Legal Advisor of the Department of State, presented to the Court of
Appeals sitting en banc to hear this case, which advised that "the
Department of State would not anticipate any foreign policy problems
if . . . foreign governments were held to be persons within the mean-
ing of Clayton Act § 4."20 On the basis of this letter, the Court felt
assured that its decision did not interfere with any sensitive matters of
foreign policy. In the dissent's view, the pronouncements of the
Department of State would not be enough. 2' The more appropriate
forum to resolve these political questions, which go beyond foreign
policy matters, and pertain to the general welfare of the United States,
would be the Congress. 22
The decision will have a number of impacts. By eliminating the
formal distinction which was previously drawn between government-
controlled foreign corporations and sovereign governments acting in a
proprietary capacity, the antitrust stakes have been raised substantial-
ly, and multinational corporations will have to weigh their decisions all
the more carefully. Foreign nations, especially those underdeveloped
nations without any antitrust clout of their own, have gained signifi-
cant leverage in their negotiating positions. Presumably, along with
their newly-won right to recover treble damages, they will be better
19 It has been suggested that an international antitrust convention be adopted to
alleviate the problems of conflicting regulations among the industrialized nations and
the absence of enforcement in the less-developed nations. Timberg, An International
Antitrust Convention: A Proposal to Harmonize Conflicting National Policies Towards
the Multi-National Corporation, 8 J. INTL L. & ECON. 157 (1973).
20 Pfizer, Inc. v. Got'd of India, 434 U.S. at 319, n.20.
11 "The significance of this communication escapes me. Nothing in the Constitu-
tion suggests legislative power may be exercised jointly by the courts and the Depart-
ment of State." Id. at 329 n.3 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). There has been no mention,
however, of the policy of adhering to Department of State suggestions on questions of
foreign sovereign immunity. Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587 (1943).
22 Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. at 330-31. (Powell, J., dissenting).
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able to deter future anticompetitive practices. The crucial question,
however, is the impact the decision will have on domestic markets. In
reaching its conclusion, the majority expressed the view that foreign
sovereign standing would further the ultimate aim of the antitrust
laws, the protection of American consumers. Speculation as to
domestic impact would be premature at this early stage. It remains to
be seen whether American consumers will reap economic benefit from
a more competitive international business environment.
Richard Jacobson

